Tracks with out trains

The inauguration of Namma Metro’s Yellow Line in August 2025 was anticipated to be a second of celebration for Bengaluru. Instead, an incomplete line working at one-fifth of its deliberate capability has delivered overcrowded trains, packed stations, and a suboptimal commuter expertise.

By 2023, Bengaluru had a completed metro line, however no trains to run on them. The delay in procuring trains is linked with geopolitics. In 2019, the Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation Limited (BMRCL) invited bids for the prepare units that will be used on Phase-2 of Bengaluru’s metro system. Eventually, Chinese state-owned rail producer, CRRC, secured a ₹1,578-crore contract for 36 prepare units of six coaches every. The price per coach for this contract (₹7.3 crore) was considerably cheaper than different opponents. The bidding course of was completed below the L1 system, by which the bottom price bidder all the time wins so long as they meet sure primary, baseline standards.

The contract mandated that 75% of the manufacturing happen in India. As a consequence, CRRC determined to construct a brand new plant at Sri City in Andhra Pradesh. It agreed to provide the primary set of 12 coaches from China inside 87 weeks, then ramp as much as ship the remaining 204 coaches from India.

The 2020 Galwan incident heightened tensions between China and India. It additionally slowed many massive Chinese-related infrastructure ventures: any direct investments from Chinese corporations wanted Cabinet permission and approval from the Home and External Affairs Ministries. This meant that the FDI and part influx that needed to occur for CRRC to arrange its Sri City manufacturing facility was now in limbo. CRRC technical employees have been denied visas.

The land switch for the Sri City manufacturing facility additionally confronted limitations. Customs seized imported components for inspection for lengthy stretches; these components needed to be launched finally by a particular clearance from the Union Cabinet. By mid-2021, BMRCL tried to cancel the contract with CRRC altogether. CRRC responded that between the coverage shifts and COVID-19, it was uncovered to pressure majeure occasions. The authorized proceedings concerned each the Delhi and Karnataka High Courts and have been sluggish.

Once the courts ordered the contract to face, CRRC accepted a workaround. It shaped a three way partnership with the Indian rail agency, Titagarh Rail Systems Ltd (TRSL). CRRC shifted native manufacturing to TRSL’s plant in West Bengal. But the transition took time as any objects or guests from China confronted scrutiny. It was solely at the beginning of 2024 {that a} prototype six-coach prepare arrived in Bengaluru from Shanghai. The second and third trains, assembled regionally, arrived in early 2025. By August 2025, the road was opened at a restricted capability. It was determined that extra trains can be added later, once they have been manufactured by TRSL.

As a results of this delay, the overall outlay rose by 32%, including ₹1,866 crore to the venture. Since the unique distinction between CRRC’s bid and an Indian competitor was round ₹410 crore, the prolonged delay price excess of what was saved by selecting the cheaper Chinese bid. Additionally, the overall last price that taxpayers needed to pay for the Yellow Line evened out to about ₹7,610 crore, giving it a ₹400 per kilometre price, which is greater than common for elevated metro strains in India.

The coverage lesson from this saga is that crucial infrastructure procurement should align with long-term strategic posture. The important calculation is whether or not the worth benefit provided by a Chinese provider is well worth the danger of geopolitical uncertainty. Regardless, as soon as a call is taken to permit Chinese capital, there should not be any ex-post reversals. Also, as an alternative of banning Chinese funding altogether, it might be extra sensible for India to undertake a graduated investment-review mechanism. Low-security-risk objects could possibly be sourced globally to leverage price advantages, whereas the best danger segments may require deeper scrutiny. Once a agency passes these necessities, it must be free to finish its venture with out coverage reversals. Finally, as an alternative of counting on a L1 method, India ought to undertake the Quality-cum-Cost Based Selection technique for infrastructure procurement. This combines a technical analysis with a monetary analysis to award a contract to the best composite scorer. It permits decision-makers to think about reliability and strategic considerations alongside uncooked price, decreasing the possibility of sudden disruptions.

The authors are with the high-tech geopolitics programme on the Takshashila Institution