On the one hand, to consolidate the anti-DMK votes and stay electorally aggressive, the AIADMK feels compelled to ally with the BJP. This pragmatic transfer will stop a deadly break up within the Opposition vote that will virtually actually profit the ruling DMK-led coalition. On the opposite, aligning with the BJP to strengthen its electoral place concurrently weakens the AIADMK’S core id. This alienates an important section of its conventional voter base, as long-time AIADMK supporters, notably from minority communities in addition to Dravidian adherents, view the BJP’s Hindutva ideology as antithetical to the celebration’s foundational ideas.
Meanwhile, the alliance, meant to bolster the AIADMK, gives the BJP with the platform and legitimacy it must develop in Tamil Nadu. This progress usually comes from poaching voters instantly from the AIADMK itself. Specifically, the BJP attracts those that have looser ties with the AIADMK’s ideological previous however have aligned with the celebration primarily as a result of they oppose the DMK.
And if the AIADMK have been to interrupt the alliance to guard its ideological core and win again disaffected voters, it might seemingly face a multi-cornered contest. This would splinter the anti-DMK vote, making a DMK victory mathematically a lot simpler.
The path that the AIADMK has chosen in an try to resolve its short-term electoral drawback — specifically, allying with the BJP — deepens its long-term existential disaster of shedding its distinctive id and voter base. The path to electoral survival seemingly requires an act of political self-harm. This is the proper definition of a Catch-22. The vote share knowledge in Table 1 A and B from the previous decade exhibits contested vote share from Assembly and Parliamentary elections.
The numbers bear this out. While the votes shares of the AIADMK considerably dropped from 2011 to 2021, the celebration retained a robust core of near 40% of votes within the seats it contested in 2021. This dropped dramatically to 23.5% within the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, when the AIADMK opted to remain out of the BJP-led alliance.
In an earlier Data Point titled ‘AIADMK and BJP break up: Diminishing electoral returns…’ in October 2023, we had superior the explanations for the regional celebration’s determination to maneuver away from the BJP as a result of a big core of its voters have been uncomfortable with the alliance. Meanwhile, the BJP’s efficiency in city native physique elections held nearer to that point confirmed that the celebration improved its vote share largely on the expense of the AIADMK.
The 2024 parliamentary elections — seen with the caveat that these have been held to resolve equations in New Delhi somewhat than in Chennai — additionally confirmed that the BJP was able to gaining floor on the expense of the AIADMK.
Meanwhile, the DMK-led alliance — an ideologically coherent entrance certain by its opposition to the BJP — retained its vote share between 2021 and 2024, enhanced by round 2% factors following the assist of Kamal Haasan’s celebration.
Data in Tables 2A, B, and C, nevertheless, complicates the image. While the AIADMK in its alliance with the BJP received near 75 Assembly seats in 2021, the break up between the 2 events resulted within the DMK main in 221 Assembly segments within the 2024 parliamentary elections. This left the AIADMK-led alliance and the BJP-led alliance to steer in simply 10 and three segments, respectively.
Hypothetically, if the alliance between the AIADMK, the BJP, and their respective companions had remained intact, they might have led in 84 segments. This would have positioned the alliance’s hypothetical 41% vote share simply 6 factors behind the ruling coalition’s 47%, a niche {that a} 3-point swing might doubtlessly bridge.
A region-wise break-up (Table 3 A and B) provides a extra granular image. In the West, or the Kongu belt from the place AIADMK chief Edappadi Ok. Palaniswami hails, the mixed alliance had received 26 out of 42 seats in 2021. In the North-Central area, the place the PMK is a robust celebration, they received 24 of the 55 seats. These numbers have been decreased to only 2 (for AIADMK+) and seven (4 for AIADMK+ and three for BJP+) segments, respectively, within the 2024 elections.
If these events had maintained their 2021 alliance, they might have led in 22 segments within the West (versus 20 for the DMK-led coalition) and 29 within the North-Central area (in opposition to 26 for the DMK+). The mixed coalition would have additionally led the DMK+ 15-14 within the South. This explains why AIADMK leaders from the West and a few within the South have given statements favouring an alliance with the BJP, whereas the PMK president acknowledged his choice for an alliance with the AIADMK in 2024.
The internecine strife inside the PMK and the DMDK’s new-found ambivalence are challenges for the AIADMK-BJP coalition too.
An extra complication for the 2026 Assembly elections is the entry of actor Vijay’s TVK. An alliance with the TVK may appear a logical approach for Mr. Palaniswami to consolidate anti-DMK votes, however two components complicate this. First, the power of the TVK’s assist base stays purely speculative. Second, the AIADMK’s influential western leaders proceed to push for nearer ties with the BJP. Caught between these pressures, the beleaguered chief seems to have chosen to return to the BJP coalition despite the fact that it should seemingly damage his celebration’s id in the long term.








