On October 11 and 12, there was an intense conflict alongside the Durand Line between Pakistan and Afghanistan with substantial casualties on either side. According to Islamabad, its forces killed greater than 200 fighters on the Afghan aspect, whereas the Taliban has claimed the killing of 58 Pakistani troopers. According to an official press launch by the Pakistan Establishment (army), there have been precision fires and strikes and bodily raids concentrating on “Taliban camps and posts, terrorist coaching amenities and assist networks working from Afghan territory, together with parts linked to Fitna al Khwarij (FAK), Fitna al Hindustan (FAH) and ISKP/ Daesh.” The Afghan army was quoted to have said that the Afghan assaults had been “in retaliation for the air strikes by Pakistani forces.” Taliban’s defence ministry went on to state that the operations ended at midnight of October 11 and “if the opposing aspect violates Afghanistan’s territory once more, our armed forces are able to defend their territory and can reply firmly.”

Following the clashes, Pakistan has closed the border crossings between the 2 nations.

For Pakistan, the clashes began on October 11, with “unprovoked” assaults from the Afghan aspect. For the Taliban, the border clashes had been a response to an earlier assault by Pakistan on October 9, inside Afghanistan within the Kabul and Paktika province. While there have been minor skirmishes throughout current years throughout the Durand Line, the most recent assaults are an important in current Afghanistan-Pakistan historical past, and prone to be transformative within the Taliban-Pakistan army Establishment relationship.

Understanding the geography

The first set of assaults within the final week befell on October 9 in Kabul, the Afghan capital, and within the Paktika province. Kabul is simply 230 km by street from Torkham on the western finish of the Khyber Pass within the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province. As the crow flies, it must be lower than 100 km if Pakistan has to conduct any aerial operations over Kabul. Of the 5 japanese Afghan provinces that share a border with two provinces of Pakistan, KP and Balochistan, Paktika shares the border with two tribal areas in KP — North and South Waziristan — the stronghold of the Mehsud and Wazir tribes.

The second set of assaults befell from October 11 to 12 alongside the Durand Line throughout the tribal areas — ranging from Chitral within the north to Waziristan within the south. In return, Pakistan had focused Afghan posts in addition to coaching command and forts on the Afghan aspect.

Chequered historical past

After propping up the Taliban within the Nineteen Nineties, and supporting it over the following twenty years, why has Pakistan turned in opposition to them now?

The set off for the current clashes differ for each nations. Media reviews have speculated that the goal of Pakistan’s assault in Kabul might have been Noor Wali Mehsud, chief of the Pakistan Taliban. The two assaults on October 9 might even have been a warning to Afghanistan to not get near India, for on that day, the Afghan overseas minister had landed in New Delhi for a week-long journey in India. Surprisingly, Pakistan’s DG-ISPR assertion on October 12 additionally refers back to the Afghan minister’s go to to India, however hyperlinks it to Afghanistan’s “severe provocation,” and ignores its earlier October 9 assault in Kabul.

While the above two incidents had been the set off, the next 5 causes may very well be recognized because the underlying causes for the tensions between Pakistan’s Establishment and the Taliban. At the core of the battle is how Pakistan and the Taliban understand one another. Pakistan’s Establishment seems on the Taliban as its vassal. It expects the latter to be glad about its creation within the Nineteen Nineties, and the essential political and army assist it has acquired, each overtly and covertly, over the last three many years from Pakistan. On the opposite hand, the Taliban sees itself as impartial, having weathered the earlier twenty years, particularly Pakistan taking part in a double act throughout the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan throughout 2001-21.

Pakistan desires Kabul to be subservient to its strategic pursuits, whereas the Taliban seeks to chart a brand new starting and pursue an impartial coverage, each inside Afghanistan and out of doors.

Kabul had additionally initiated a dialogue with China. In August 2025, China’s overseas minister, Wang Yi, visited Kabul and talked about investments in Afghanistan, particularly within the mining sector. China has additionally began receiving official delegations from Afghanistan, together with its Ambassador. In July 2025, Russia recognised the Taliban and accepted its Ambassador in Moscow. The Taliban desires to have its personal exterior engagement whereas Islamabad expects its approval for a similar. Pakistan’s assault in Kabul and Paktika final week, when the Afghan overseas minister was visiting India, isn’t a coincidence. Pakistan desires the Taliban to be depending on it, from financial system and commerce to overseas coverage. The current New Delhi-Kabul rapprochement has not gone down effectively with the Establishment.

Secondly, Pakistan desires the Taliban to surrender its assist to the Tehrik-e-Taliban-Pakistan (TTP). Pakistan has been accusing the Taliban of offering a secure haven for the TTP, and in addition to Daesh and Indian proxies. The Taliban had developed shut linkages with the TTP throughout the U.S. occupation. The Pakistani Taliban, particularly the Mehsuds and Wazirs, had supplied essential assist to the Taliban when Pakistan was taking part in a double recreation throughout 2001-21. So, it’s doable that the Taliban nonetheless maintains connections with the TTP. However, Taliban disagrees with the Pakistan Establishment, and blames the latter’s militant issues squarely on Pakistan itself. For the Taliban, the Daesh militants are equally a menace.

Third, inside Pakistan, the Establishment has both usurped exterior relations vis-à-vis the Taliban and Afghanistan, or the Parliament has abdicated its duty of the identical. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, it has been the Establishment which has carried out Pakistan’s Afghan coverage and never the Parliament. The latter has turn into a mere spectator, and even a supporter. The very first thing that Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif mentioned after the most recent clashes with Afghanistan was to reward the Army Chief for his resolve. The weak civil-military relations inside Pakistan have been an essential consider Pakistan’s troubled relationship with all its neighbours, together with Afghanistan.

Fourth, for the Taliban, the most important challenge is Islamabad’s unilateral determination to deport Afghan nationals from Pakistan. Since the Eighties, Pakistan has been internet hosting tens of millions of Afghans who crossed the Durand Line in a number of waves. During the Eighties and 90s, Pakistan noticed Afghan nationals as an asset, and as a part of its strategic pursuits. Now, with the Taliban on the helm, Pakistan considers the Afghans inside their territory as a legal responsibility. Since 2023, Pakistan has been unilaterally deporting, first, undocumented Afghan migrants (who got here into Pakistan with none legitimate papers or registration), and later even registered Afghan refugees. The Taliban and the Afghans are in opposition to such unilateral deportation. Even worldwide organisations, such because the UN Human Rights Council, have criticised Pakistan’s determination to deport Afghan migrants and refugees.

The fifth and remaining challenge is the unilateral and repeated closure of border factors by Pakistan in KP and Balochistan — particularly at Torkham and Chaman. These two border factors usually are not solely the biggest bilateral commerce posts but additionally the first entry and exit factors for items and other people into Afghanistan. Though Afghanistan shares borders with Iran and Central Asia, traditionally, these two factors have acted as international gateways for the motion of Afghans and of products. Pakistan understands the strategic significance of those border factors for Afghanistan; lately, it has repeatedly closed these two border posts, primarily as a stress technique in opposition to Kabul.

Pakistan sees the border factors as a leverage, whereas Afghanistan sees them as their lifeline.

Readjusting relations

Pakistan, throughout the previous few years, has been wanting on the altering regional state of affairs and pursuing actions to deal with it. Its current rapprochement with Iran, its defence settlement with Saudi Arabia and the current developments with the U.S. are a part of this.

Similarly, the Taliban has additionally began to readjust to its regional atmosphere. During current years, it has been dealing with an assertive Iran, and like Islamabad, Tehran has additionally been deporting Afghan nationals. As talked about above, the Taliban has opened a entrance with its speedy and prolonged neighbourhood — Moscow, Beijing and now New Delhi. Taliban wants these exterior engagements, not just for political causes, but additionally to maintain its financial system and rebuild Afghanistan.

Pakistan additionally has a severe inside downside in Balochistan and KP, for which the Establishment is blaming different nations, particularly India.

If Pakistan sees Afghanistan as a vassal state, blaming Kabul (and India) for all its inside violence will worsen the connection. The Establishment’s management of Pakistan’s Afghan coverage will worsen an already dangerous state of affairs.

D. Suba Chandran is Professor and Dean, School of Conflict and Security Studies, National Institute of Advanced Studies.

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